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1
Overview
Psychologists have been interested in human cognitive processing for centuries. Humans
use language in numerous ways and through multiple modalities with impressive efficiency. As
a result, we are constantly bombarded by language as we make our way through society,
encountering billboards, flyers, and conversations.

As such, understanding how cognitive

processes allow us to attach meaning to linguistic stimuli is essential.
Sometimes, linguistic interactions are clear and result in effective communication, as
intended by Grice (1975). Other times linguistic stimuli can be ambiguous. For example, in the
absence of context, a word like bark might activate one of two very different concepts (related to
either tree or dog). How is this type of ambiguity resolved? This question has prompted the
present investigation. Various models have been proposed to explain how meaning is retrieved,
and these make different predictions relating to ambiguity resolution.

First, a very brief

overview of word processing will be provided as background, followed by a discussion of two
competing accounts of meaning retrieval: the exhaustive activation account and the selective
activation account.
Although a large body of research already exists clarifying some aspects of the ambiguity
resolution process, a much smaller body of research exists to explain how various cognitive
contexts affect this process. There is empirical evidence of a small number of cognitive factors
(such as reading ability (Gernsbacher & Robertson, 1995)) affecting the ambiguity resolution
process. Ergo, to further probe the role of cognitive factors on the processing of ambiguous
words and on the ambiguity resolution process, two manipulations will be introduced: focus and
cognitive load. Empirical evidence for potential effects of focus and cognitive load will be
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explained and their potential theoretical relevance will be outlined. Finally, the proposed study
will be described in detail and predictions will be enumerated.
Relevance
Exploring cognitive processing under various conditions helps us to better understand
general processing and guides the generation or revision of cognitive models, which in turn may
lead to further questions related to general cognitive processing. Thus, the motivation for the
present series of experiments is to contribute to the current literature examining ambiguity
resolution (and language processing more generally) and to fill an important gap in the literature,
as it will attempt to explain how cognitive contexts such as working memory load and focus
affect the process of ambiguity resolution.
There are numerous practical applications for the knowledge that will be obtained from
the proposed studies and multiple branches of society may benefit from advancing our
understanding in this area.

Concretely, understanding how the human mind processes

ambiguous information could help to inform computer models of language recognition (Miller,
2001) including those used specifically for the purpose of translation (e.g., software) and
retrieving information (e.g., search engine searches).

Since the users of these systems are

humans, improvements within them can be achieved from a better understanding of how humans
process information. Additionally, understanding many forms of humor is rooted in ambiguity
(Bucaria, 2004; Ritchie, 1999) so those involved in marketing may be able to better target their
audience for important campaigns such as obesity awareness or smoking-cessation programs by
using information from resolving the issues related to ambiguity resolution. Finally, the areas of
preventing or resolving misunderstandings may also benefit from this information, helping to
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inform policies and procedures related to law enforcement, border security, and many other
areas.
Word Recognition
To engage in successful communication, interlocutors must cooperate in order to accept
and retain the same meaning or implicature (Grice, 1975).

Although Grice’s principle of

cooperation was originally for verbal communication, technological advances have resulted in an
increasing number of “conversations” occurring in written form (e.g., email, text messaging).
Additionally, more and more communicative exchanges are occurring with little to no sentence
frames (e.g., texting using shorthand, or a series of keywords). In these situations, each word
must be understood in the same way by both parties in order to successfully communicate a
thought or idea. Briefly detailed in this section is how meaning is retrieved from within the
cognitive system.
A question that comes up when considering meaning retrieval, however, is whether this
process results in an exhaustive search, activating the entire realm of possible meanings when a
word is encountered, or whether the retrieval process can be limited a priori by a certain criteria.
This is the next question related to word processing that is explored.
Accessing Meaning
In order to understand the meaning of a given word, a mental representation for that word
must be activated. During this process, related concepts (or nodes) are also activated. This
meaning retrieval appears to be done relatively automatically, and with little cognitive effort
(Rayner & Sereno, 1994). Even meanings of ambiguous words (embedded in disambiguating
sentences) are purported to be retrieved by 550 milliseconds (Simpson, 1981).
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By this point, it should be clear that an ambiguous word like bark has a common
representation at both the orthographic and phonological levels, but different semantic
representations. The more frequent the meaning, the stronger the connection from orthography
or phonology to the semantic level. However, meaning selection is perhaps not as clear-cut as
depicted here. More specifically, most words can be interpreted in a variety of ways, either
because they have multiple meanings or because of the semantic context within which they are
interpreted (e.g., puns and metaphors).

For example, in order to understand the intended

meaning of the statement That defense lawyer is a shark, features of both lawyer and shark must
be activated (and remain active) in order to be integrated (Gernsbacher, Keysar, Robertson, &
Werner, 2001). Models specifically developed to explain the processing of ambiguous words
will be detailed in the next section.
Ambiguity and Ambiguity Resolution
There are various levels of ambiguity in language, but generally ambiguity is expressed
as either structural or lexical (Bach, 1998). Structural ambiguity refers to a sentence that can be
interpreted in more than one way based on its underlying structure (Bach, 1998). For example,
the sentence “Slow men at work.” may be communicating that (1) men who are slow are at work
or that (2) one should slow down because men are at work.
Lexical ambiguity, which is far more common, refers to the referent of a word being
uncertain (Bach, 1998). In the case of word-level ambiguity, the most important distinction of
theoretical interest relates to the number of entries purported to be in the mental lexicon: that is,
the distinction between polysemy and homonymy (Meyer, 2005).
Polysemy vs. Homonymy
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Polysemy is a single lexical entry with multiple related meanings. For example, church
can refer to the building, institution or group of people, but there is a great deal of semantic
overlap between these referents (Meyer, 2005). Similarly, the word lip, which has multiple
meanings all referring to something similar in form or function to human lips, constitutes another
example of polysemy (Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007). In a case such as this where the meanings
are so closely related, an ambiguous word is said to make up a single entry in the lexicon.
Homonymy is a term that refers to two words with the same spelling and sound, but with
different meanings (Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007; Meyer, 2005). For example, bark refers
either to the outer layer of a tree or to the sound that a dog makes. Although words can be
ambiguous in a variety of ways, the term ambiguity is used in the present paper to refer
specifically to visual lexical ambiguity where a letter string has only one pronunciation and its
multiple meanings are unrelated. This type of ambiguous word can be termed a homophonic
homograph (e.g., Frost & Bentin, 1992) or more simply a homonym (e.g., Klepousniotou &
Baum, 2007).
It is important to distinguish between polysemy and homonymy because there is evidence
of processing differences (e.g., Klepousniotou, 2002; Klepousniotou & Baum, 2007). A speed
advantage in a lexical decision task has been found for polysemous words but not homonymous
words (Klepousnitou & Baum, 2007). This advantage suggests that polysemous words make up
a single entry in the mental lexicon as there is no competition between multiple meanings and no
ambiguity per se to resolve when the word is encountered (Klepousniotou, 2002; Klepousniotou
& Baum, 2007).
Models and Mechanisms of Ambiguity Resolution
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There are at least two general accounts that can explain what happens to the contextually
inappropriate meaning of an ambiguous word: it is activated and a secondary process (e.g.,
suppression) is applied to reduce its activation; or it is not activated.

These accounts of

ambiguity resolution are described below.
Both Meanings are Activated. As the name implies, an exhaustive (or non-selective)
access means that all possible meanings are initially activated in parallel. This initial activation
is not influenced by external factors such as word frequency and context (Onifer & Swinney,
1981). In order to identify the meaning of a word, a secondary selection process of suppression
(which is not automatic and thus requires cognitive resources) occurs post-lexically, using wordlevel characteristics such as the surrounding context.
There is strong evidence to support the existence of this type of dampening mechanism,
specifically from reported semantic priming effects for both meanings of ambiguous words. In a
study by Onifer and Swinney (1981), participants listened to sentences where the sentence
context biased the ambiguous word to one of its meanings and, simultaneously, performed a
visual lexical decision task.

Facilitation (i.e., priming) effects were found for both

interpretations of the ambiguous word during the lexical decision task- even the one that was not
elicited by the sentence context (Onifer & Swinney, 1981). So, even the unintended meaning
showed facilitation in spite of the contextual clues provided in the sentence, suggesting that, at
least initially, context is not taken into account when retrieving meaning. The finding that all
meanings are initially activated for ambiguous words appears to be a robust one, as this effect
has also been shown to occur with words that are ambiguous cross-linguistically (Beauvillain &
Grainger, 1987; de Groot, Delmaar, & Lupker, 2000). However, what remains unclear is how a
meaning is selected and exactly what happens to the unselected meaning.
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Another body of research has shown some evidence for a second mechanism
(suppression) in meaning retrieval, whereby, although meanings are initially activated
exhaustively, a secondary mechanism is applied to reduce the activation of the contextually
inappropriate meaning. Gernsbacher’s group (e.g., Gernsbacher, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2002;
Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991a, 1991b, 1995; Gernsbacher, et al., 2001; Gernsbacher & Robertson,
1995; Gernsbacher & Shlesinger, 1997; Gernsbacher & St. John, 2002) has proposed the
Structure-Building Framework as a general cognitive mechanism to account for comprehension.
After both meanings are activated, the contextually inappropriate one is suppressed to belowbaseline levels and only the appropriate meaning is retained. She proposes a three-step process
to achieve meaning: laying a foundation, mapping additional information onto that foundation,
and shifting to build new substructures. Additionally, the building of these meaning structures is
guided by two mechanisms: enhancement (or activation) and suppression. More specifically, the
foundation of the mental structure is formed by the initial activation at the time of presentation.
Then, any new (and consistent) information is mapped onto this structure and related memory
nodes are further activated. If the new information is inconsistent, then a new substructure is
formed and the inconsistent information is suppressed as the information is judged no longer
necessary or useful for comprehension.
According to this model, all potential meanings are initially activated, but this activation
is later constrained (or suppressed) so that only the most active is incorporated into the mental
structure.

So, rather than proposing that a single meaning is selected by building up its

activation, they propose an active mechanism that rapidly (albeit not immediately) suppresses the
inappropriate meaning. Importantly, this mechanism necessitates cognitive resources to apply
(i.e., it is not automatic). As it relates specifically to ambiguity resolution, the inappropriate
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meaning of the homograph would be suppressed while the appropriate meaning would be
enhanced. However, Gernsbacher’s group has studied this possibility almost exclusively at the
sentence-level. It is not clear whether a similar mechanism operates in the absence of the
sentence (i.e., whether this mechanism operates at the word-level).
Below-baseline activation of the alternate meaning of an ambiguous word has been
reported in a number of studies (e.g., Gernsbacher, Robertson, & Werner, 2002).

In this

example, participants were shown sentences ending in an ambiguous word (e.g., match). For
each sentence, the participants’ task was to indicate if the sentence made sense. For each target
sentence (e.g., She lit the match.), the previous trial was either a same-meaning prime (e.g., She
blew out the match.), a baseline/neutral sentence (e.g., She saw the match.) or the alternative
meaning (e.g., She won the match.). Congruent trials (same meaning) showed facilitation (i.e., a
priming effect), with faster reaction times (RTs) and lower errors in making the judgment.
Incongruent trials showed interference with below-baseline activation and more errors. This
suggests that subsequent to activating a meaning in the first sentence, there is a cost to activating
the alternate meaning. Since the activation of this alternative meaning is below the baseline
measure, then activation alone is insufficient to account for this cost. This is therefore taken as
evidence for the suppression of the inappropriate meaning for ambiguous words. Much of the
evidence for suppression occurs in the context of a sentence, but there is some evidence for this
type of secondary mechanism being used for meaning selection at the word level.
Simpson and Kang (1994) present evidence of this type of account in a word paradigm.
In their task, participants first saw an ambiguous word as a prime (e.g., bank) followed by
another word on which they had to perform a naming task. This second word could be related to
one of the meanings of the prime (e.g., stream) or unrelated. In a subsequent trial, they were
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again shown the same ambiguous word (bank) but this time the naming task could be performed
on the previously unelicited meaning of the homograph (e.g., money) or a control word.
Simpson and Kang (1994) found that selecting one meaning during the first presentation results
in slower naming times on the incongruent (i.e., opposite meaning) trial later on. Here, however,
congruent trials did not yield facilitation (i.e., priming) and performance was no different from
the control. This is somewhat concerning given that there is ample evidence that priming effects
are robust and fairly long-lasting (for example, Gorfein (2000), found these effects after 19
intervening trials). Further, it is uncertain that a meaning was actually selected during the prime
presentation, as a naming task does not require meaning retrieval (in this case, the slower naming
times could be attributed to another source, such as an extraneous stimulus characteristic on
which conditions were not matched (like imageability), since the published report does not
specify on which word-level features the conditions were matched, if any). Still, this provides
evidence supporting the possibility that a subsequent presentation of the alternate meaning of a
homograph word may result in a reduction of activation at the word level.
Only the Appropriate Meaning is Activated. A selective search account proposes a
constraint in the meaning retrieval process pre-lexically. Although activation initially builds up
for all meanings, only one meaning is selected: the one that reaches a pre-determined activation
threshold first. As such, meaning selection depends on the amount of activation a meaning
receives, which depends on characteristics such as word frequency and context (Perfetti, 1999).
High-frequency words, for example, would receive more activation than low-frequency words.
Ambiguous words are typically responded to more slowly, and this is said to be a result of the
competition that occurs between multiple meanings (Conklin, 2005); these meanings are
activated serially, based on lexico-semantic factors such as frequency and context. In this way,
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individuals only have access to a single meaning, ideally the one that was intended (Glucksberg,
Kreuz, & Rho, 1986).
Gorfein, Brown, and DeBiasi’s (2007) Activation-Selection Model proposes that a simple
activation mechanism (which is automatic and consequently requires no cognitive resources) is
sufficient to account for meaning selection. They propose that meaning is based on a small
number of attributes and that these attributes are activated based on two things: their weight in
the network (which is based on our experience) and the external context. The higher the weight,
the easier it is for that feature to be activated. Additionally, a contextually-appropriate attribute
would be more easily activated than a contextually inappropriate attribute. These two factors
guide the activation of meaning and thus are responsible for meaning selection. When the
activation threshold is reached with these attributes for a given meaning, that meaning is
selected. The activation of each of these attributes, however, is brief and transient and decays
slowly over time.
When a homograph and a related attribute are presented together (e.g., the word pair treebark), attributes related to both of these (such as leaf) also get activated. This activation results in
a re-weighting of these attributes, so that their activation becomes easier in the future. So, the
selection of one of the meanings of a homograph (barktree) increases the weight of the attributes
associated with that meaning (e.g., leaf and tree). If that same homograph is presented a second
time (e.g., bark), there is an increased probability that those attributes will become activated
again (because the weight of those recently activated features is now greater than before), and
thus contribute to the activation threshold being reached for that same meaning of the
homograph. As a result, the same meaning shows priming (i.e., higher activation) on the second
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presentation and less activation for the other meaning. So, in a paradigm where the homograph
is repeated, only the appropriate meaning should be activated during the second presentation.
What is perhaps less evident from this account is what would be expected if a homograph
were only presented once- would the weight of the attributes affect the retrieval of either
homograph meaning in the absence of a second occurrence of the homograph. Gorfein (2001)
did examine this kind of processing using balanced homographs in a semantic relatedness
judgment task. Pairs of words were presented to participants who had to indicate whether the
words in the pair were semantically related.

In one experiment, the homograph was only

presented once. On a particular trial (trial N), the homograph pair was presented (e.g., sealdolphin).

The critical pair (either walrus-otter or glue-shut) was presented 19 trials later.

Facilitation occurred only on the congruent meaning (i.e., the animal meaning of seal). The
alternate meaning of the homograph (the envelope meaning of seal), received no such facilitation
and was no different from baseline on this same trial (N+19). In a different experiment, they
presented both meanings of the homograph: one meaning (e.g., seal-dolphin) on a given trial
(trial N) and the other meaning (e.g., seal-envelope), 9 trials later. On trial N +19, the critical
stimulus was presented (either walrus-otter or glue-shut). In this experiment, priming was
shown for both meanings on trial N+19, suggesting that both were still active. This can be
interpreted as evidence against the existence of a suppression mechanism since both meanings
were available, and neither had been suppressed.
Although there is evidence to support both accounts (selective and exhaustive), it may be
the case that meaning selection is only achieved by applying the process of suppression in certain
circumstances (e.g., when there are enough cognitive resources available; or when the preceding
context allows for clear meaning selection), while other instances of ambiguity are resolved by
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using other means (e.g., word frequency). Examining ambiguity resolution when participants are
under cognitive load and when the homograph is focused should help to further understand this
process.
Focus
Linguistic focus has been defined in the literature as a mechanism that highlights the
constituent that is the most important or that is emphasized (Birch & Garnsey, 1995). Similarly,
Chomsky (1971) defined focus as placing an element of the sentence in the spotlight. It has been
suggested that linguistic focus is a mechanism used by a speaker to bring the interlocutor’s
attention to the salient aspect or aspects of the message being conveyed (Birch & Garnsey,
1995). Most definitions of focus also suppose that focusing an element results in a more detailed
representation of that element, and consequently in better understanding (Langford & Holmes,
1979). It has also been argued that focus is the linguistic characteristic that allows for the
comprehension of written or spoken discourse, given our limited memory capacity (Birch &
Garnsey, 1995).
Ferreira, Bailey, and Ferraro (2002) have proposed the Good-Enough Model of
Representation. Good-enough representation suggests that people only include as much detail in
their mental representations as is necessary for the task at hand (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro,
2002). Linguistic focus increases the detail of the representation, so it appears that focusing
results in a more detailed representation in memory (A. J. S. Sanford, Sanford, Filik, & Molle,
2005). Sturt, Sanford, Stewart, and Dawydiak (2004) suggest that when not in focus, a change to
a semantically similar word might not be noticed (e.g., the word cap in a sentence is changed to
the word hat); but at a finer level of representation (such as when the word is focused), it is much
easier to detect these changes. A. J. S. Sanford, Sanford, Molle, and Emmott’s (2006) results
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are also in line with Sturt et al.’s (2004) account. They found that a crude (or good-enough)
level of representation is only further specified for items that are in focus. So, without deeper
processing resulting from focusing constructions, a good-enough representation will remain
(Ferreira, et al., 2002). That is, people will engage in shallow processing unless there is reason
to further process a part of the input (Ferreira & Patson, 2007; A. J. Sanford & Sturt, 2002).
Linguistic focus has been shown to have important effects on processing. For example,
Singer (1976) and McKoon, Ratcliff, Ward, and Sproat (1993) have found an advantage in
memory for focused nouns. Faster retrieval (Birch, Albrecht, & Myers, 2000; Birch & Garnsey,
1995) and greater attention (McKoon, et al., 1993) for focused words have also been reported,
with these effects being demonstrated in both written and spoken language, and focusing has
been shown to result in better retention of surface information in sentences (Birch & Garnsey,
1995). Conversely, unfocused words are processed with less detail, which may lead to increased
processing errors (Baker & Wagner, 1987; Bredart & Docquier, 1989; Bredart & Modolo, 1988;
Hornby, 1974).

These types of within-language focus effects appear to be robust and

independent from the task (Birch & Garnsey, 1995).
Types of Focus
Focusing your attention on a particular stimulus (or a subpart of the encountered
stimulus) can be achieved by numerous focusing structures. Lexical and syntactic focus can be
achieved by using a variety of lexical markers such as the indefinite this that lexically marks the
focused noun (Birch, et al., 2000) and syntactic structures such as clefting. For example, it-cleft
constructions (e.g. It was the…) and there-insertion (e.g. There was this…) are syntactic
structures that bring focus to a noun in the context of a sentence (Birch, et al., 2000). Similar
syntactic focusing structures are also present in many languages (Féry, 2001). Evidence for this
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was reported by Kennette, Wurm, and Van Havermaet (2010), who found that it-cleft
constructions produced focus effects both within and across languages. A limitation of this type
of focusing manipulation is that it can only be used in the context of a sentence. Since the
stimuli of the present studies are words and not sentences, a method of focusing a single word
outside of the context of a sentence must be used.
For the purpose of this dissertation, focus refers to perceptual focus. To perceptually
focus a word, visual characteristics can be manipulated. Perceptual focusing methods modify the
text to be encountered, making the target word visually different from the other word or words
presented. Examples of these characteristics include text size, text color, font, and font style
(bold, italic, underline,

UPPERCASE).

Recently, A. J. S. Sanford et al. (2006) used italicized

text to produce focusing effects (though this was applied in sentences) and reported that when
participants encountered an italicized word, they were able to make finer distinctions in meaning,
such as between the words cap and hat. The present inquiry examines the effect of perceptual
focus on ambiguity resolution. It appears that few (if any) researchers use focusing structures
outside the context of sentences, even though focus by way of visual characteristics lends itself
well to word-level investigations.
Cognitive Load
Definition
Cognitive load refers to the amount of cognitive resources (i.e., working memory (WM)
resources) being occupied by a task or other processing of stimuli. For example, working on a
complex math problem without any external aids would have higher load than a simpler
mathematical problem because it requires the manipulation of larger amounts of information in
WM. Performing two tasks simultaneously would have a similar effect− this increases the load
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on WM and is typically how WM load is manipulated by researchers. Performance on many
cognitive tasks can be predicted by WM measures (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).
This issue will be discussed in greater detail later.
There are individual differences in “baseline” WM span (i.e., the total amount of
cognitive resources available to an individual) and this capacity may also be influenced by other
factors such as expertise (Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989). Experts have been shown to have
increased functional WM capacity for information within their area of expertise, but show no
such advantage when they recall items that are not within this area (Ericsson & Staszewski,
1989), suggesting perhaps increased proficiency in handling or chunking information within their
area of expertise.
Load Effects on Performance
When completing a task, adding a secondary task requires the use of some additional
available cognitive resources, thus increasing the load. This typically results in an impairment in
performance (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Under increased cognitive load, performance suffers;
information is processed more slowly and less accurately than under normal conditions.
Increased WM load has even been shown to affect higher-order tasks such as reading, learning,
and reasoning (Baddeley, 1992; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Engle, 2002).
Darley, Klatzky, and Atkinson (1972) presented participants with a series of letters, of
which one was selected for a memory probe task where they had to identify whether the selected
letter was part of the presented list. Increasing cognitive load from 1 to 5 letters in the memory
set resulted in a linear increase in RTs and higher error rates. These data support the notion that
cognitive load is a construct that can be actively manipulated in a laboratory setting.
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More recently, Kossowska (2007) showed differences in negative priming effects for
low-short-term memory (STM) capacity vs. high-STM capacity individuals. STM is the storage
subcomponent of WM, which additionally contains the attentional component of processing
(Cowan, 1988). STM and WM are strongly correlated (r = .68) though separate constructs
(Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). Negative priming is somewhat different from the
ambiguity resolution process that is of interest here, but examining negative priming may shed
some light on relevant cognitive processes and how they might be affected by load. In a negative
priming paradigm, participants are explicitly instructed to ignore a given part of the presented
stimulus. Negative priming is said to occur when a stimulus that was previously ignored is later
presented in a position that requires a response and that response is delayed. Such a delay could
be due to below-baseline activation (i.e., suppression). In Kossowska’s (2007) study, a reliable
negative priming effect was only found in high-STM individuals. In addition, the effect was
reduced under cognitive load, presumably because load decreased the efficiency of the
“ignoring” mechanism. Thus, negative priming seems to need cognitive resources much like
suppression does, and when fewer of these resources are available, the effect is diminished. The
most parsimonious account of cognitive processing would suggest that the same mechanism(s)
operate for both the negative priming reported by Kossowska and the reduction in activation
found in the ambiguity resolution literature, especially given the assumption that both of these
processes require the use cognitive resources (i.e., are not automatic). However, because one
phenomenon requires explicitly ignoring an alternate stimulus while the “ignoring” in the other
case is a by-product of meaning selection, these effects may stem from two distinct mechanisms
that simply share a cognitive resource pool. Interested readers may also see Engle (2002) for a
recent discussion of the effects of cognitive load as it relates to higher-order processes.
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The Present Study
Overview
The rationale for the present investigation is to expand our current understanding of
language processing, specifically as it relates to ambiguity resolution. Of equal importance, the
present investigation will attempt to fill in an important gap in the literature, as few studies have
examined how cognitive contexts (such as increased cognitive load and perceptual focus) affect
ambiguity resolution.
Previous researchers have used various techniques to investigate the process of ambiguity
resolution, but generally congruent conditions (the same meaning is presented in both
presentations/timepoints) have led to facilitation, and incongruent conditions (different meanings
at both presentations) have led to either interference (e.g., Gernsbacher, et al., 2002), priming
(e.g., Onifer & Swinney, 1981), or no effect at all (McNamara & McDaniel, 2004). Each
component of the present study will be described in greater detail in order to orient the reader to
the rationale behind the choices made here and the selection of the proposed paradigm.
Research Questions
This series of studies was designed to answer the following research questions:
1- Is there only one process (activation) involved in ambiguity resolution at the word-level or
does evidence exist to support a secondary process (suppression)?
2- Will increasing the depth of processing (by using perceptual focus) result in differences in the
ambiguity-resolution process and as a result may contribute to answering Question 1 (e.g., more
pronounced processing differences)?
3- If there is evidence of a secondary process, to what extent might cognitive load affect its use?
That is, does ambiguity resolution require the use of cognitive resources such that taxing the
system will result in processing differences?
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Paradigm
In order to examine the processes involved in ambiguity resolution the task used must
give the researcher control over which meaning of the homograph is elicited and then assess the
availability of each of the homograph’s meanings. As such, there are at least two ways of
assessing the processing of ambiguous words: presenting the homograph twice or only once
(Gorfein, 2001).
The first class of paradigms presents the homograph more than once to examine the state
of the semantic system. In paradigms with two presentations of the homograph, the original
presentation serves as an initial activation of a specified meaning of the homograph (typically in
the context of a sentence) and the second presentation serves to assess the remaining activation
of each of the meanings (often by way of a lexical decision task). Simpson and Adamopoulos
(2001) showed participants a sentence with a homograph in it such as The hungry calf ate the
corn from a bucket. This sentence was then followed by either a congruent sentence (e.g., The
farmer’s calf won first prize at the fair.) or an incongruent sentence (e.g., The runner’s calf hurt
after he ran the race.). The participants’ task was to determine if the sentence made sense.
Priming (faster responses) for related meanings and slower responses for unrelated meanings
were found.
It is also possible to use this double presentation paradigm using only words.

For

example, in the Simpson and Kang (1994) paradigm described earlier, homographs primes (e.g.,
bank) were followed by a word that disambiguated the context in the first presentation (e.g.,
stream) and on a subsequent presentation this meaning was the same or changed (e.g., money).
They found lower activation of the previously non-primed meaning, resulting in a delay in the
retrieval of that meaning. That is, incongruent trials resulted in slowed processing. However,
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they did not find any priming effects. There is at least one possible reason for this, which will be
addressed in the proposed study. It is conceivable that the prime word was processed too
passively during its presentation to truly activate the desired meaning and lead to priming effects.
Others (e.g., Mari-Beffa, Fuentes, Catena, & Houghton, 2000), have reported that passive
activation of a prime (during a letter monitoring task, for example) results in lower priming
effects, so this is a realistic possibility. The proposed study will require participants to actively
process the prime and to select one of the homograph’s meanings during the prime presentation.
This will be accomplished by requiring a semantic judgment task on the pair of words used as
the prime, which necessarily requires meaning activation.
The second class of tasks presents the homograph only once and then measures the access
to the alternate meaning by using words of varying relations to the homograph. This second kind
of paradigm has obtained more consistent results, with facilitation for congruent meanings and
near baseline activation for incongruent meanings (Gorfein, 2001).

For these types of

paradigms, the activation of the desired meaning of a homograph and the assessment of the
activation of both meanings is made with a single presentation of the homograph. This can be
achieved using sentences such as She heard the bark. or word pairs such as bank-money. In a
slight exception to this finding, however, Nievas and Mari-Beffa (2002) found both priming and
a reduction in activation using words. They presented word pairs to elicit a particular meaning
of the homograph (e.g., bank-money) using a relatedness judgment task to force meaningselection. This task was then followed by a lexical decision task to either a related-meaning
word (e.g., save), to the alternate meaning of the homograph (e.g., lake) or to an unrelated
control (e.g., cat). Using this task, they reported overall facilitation for the congruent condition,
and a dampening of activation for the incongruent condition. However, this effect was driven by
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the “slow but accurate” responders, whose performance differed significantly on congruent and
incongruent trials. The other two strategy groups- fast but low accuracy, and those with a
moderate speed and moderate accuracy- did not show any reliable differences from baseline in
the incongruent trials (though priming was consistently found in the congruent condition), which
is consistent with previous findings.
This single presentation of homographs outside of sentence contexts appears to be the
most advantageous because it is less exigent to control extraneous variables at the word-level
than at the sentence-level. Ergo, the present paradigm includes only a single presentation of the
ambiguous word following a similar method to that of Neivas and Marì-Beffa (2002): each trial
will consist of a relatedness judgment task immediately followed by a lexical decision task.
Different types of processing have been shown to occur at different times during
semantic processing.

For example, automatic processes occur up until stimulus onset

asynchronies (SOAs) of approximately 150 ms, while meaning is retrieved at around 400 ms and
more controlled processes such as ambiguity resolution have been shown to take between 750 ms
and 1000ms. For this reason, the judgment task and the lexical decision task proposed in the
present dissertation will be separated by 1000 ms in order to allow suppression to take place, if
this mechanism is involved in ambiguity resolution at the word-level.
For stimuli, the present dissertation uses homonyms− words with one spelling and
pronunciation but two unrelated meanings− rather than polysemous words. The rationale for this
decision, detailed in an earlier section, is based most notably on the fact that the proposed model
of polysemous representation suggests no competition between meanings (Klepousniotou, 2002).
The literature is somewhat inconsistent about the terminology used when conducting ambiguity
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resolution research and some may have combined these two types of words without taking into
account their processing differences (as discussed in Klepousniotou, 2002).
In everyday linguistic encounters, context (whether environmental or linguistic) is one
way to disambiguate an originally ambiguous word (Dixon & Twilley, 1999; Klepousniotou,
2002; Miller, 2001; A. J. Sanford, 2002; Simpson, 1994; Tabossi, 1988).

Dealing with

ambiguous words in isolation makes it nearly impossible to know for certain which meaning is
intended. There are, however, other factors that determine which meaning is retrieved, including
written or spoken word frequency (Brysbaert & New, 2009; Kennette, et al., 2010; Roodenrys,
Hulme, Alban, Ellis, & Brown, 1994), length (Balota, Cortese, Sergent-Marshall, Spieler, &
Yap, 2004; Kennette, et al., 2010; Whaley, 1978), familiarity (Balota, et al., 2004; Gernsbacher,
1984; Stadthagen-Gonzalez & Davis, 2006; Tengi, 1998), orthographic neighborhood (Andrews,
1997; Grainger, Muneaux, Farioli, & Ziegler, 2005), and imageability/concreteness (Balota, et
al., 2004; Burton, Krebs-Noble, Gullapalli, & Berndt, 2009; Stadthagen-Gonzalez & Davis,
2006; Whaley, 1978).

It is important to note that some of these terms are used almost

interchangeably in the literature (though many of them do covary, such as more familiar words
are typically more frequent and/or more concrete). Gernsbacher (1984), for example, reports a
strong relationship (r = .81) between frequency and familiarity ratings. As such only length,
frequency, orthographic neighborhood, and concreteness will be controlled in the proposed
study.
Manipulations
In the standard iteration of the task (Experiment 1), participants will complete a set of
two-part trials. The first part involves a relatedness judgment task on a word pair (which, on
critical trials, includes an ambiguous word), followed immediately by a lexical decision task.
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During a second iteration of this task (Experiment 2), focus will be manipulated. During
this manipulation, the context word that accompanies the ambiguous word will be focused.
Specifically, focus will be induced by using uppercase text.
The third and final iteration of the proposed experimental paradigm (Experiment 3) will
manipulate cognitive load during the completion of the task. Cognitive load will be manipulated
by introducing a 5-digit number before the beginning of each loaded trial and requiring
participants to recall this number at the end of the trial.
Hypotheses1
No predictions are made with respect to the judgment task as these judgments serve only
to bias the meaning that is selected. Ergo, the hypotheses presented below rely solely on the
analyses of the lexical decision data.
1) Evidence for priming and some form of suppression is expected.
Both the Activation-Selection (Gorfein, 2001) and the Structure-Building (Gernsbacher,
1997) accounts of meaning selection predict facilitation (i.e., priming) for congruent trials, but
where they differ is in their prediction for performance in the incongruent trials.
Results are expected to be in line with Gernsbacher’s Structure-Building Framework by
demonstrating evidence of suppression. From this full suppression account, performance in the
incongruent condition is expected to be slower than the baseline (i.e., control condition).
However, weaker evidence of suppression may also be found, indicated by a reduction in
priming in the incongruent condition (i.e., partial suppression). This would be evidence of
suppression since an exhaustive activation account attests that both meanings of the homograph
are originally activated (and thus a reduced priming effect would still support a suppression

1

A pilot study was conducted to guide some of these hypotheses.
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account). Results like these have been reported using a word paradigm similar to the one
employed in the present dissertation (e.g., Gadsby, Arnott, & Copland, 2008).
In support of Gorfein’s Activation-Selection account, the activation-only account predicts
little to no activation of the incongruent meaning. This is because context (word pair in the
judgment decision) quickly activates the appropriate meaning to its selection threshold and so no
priming should be evident for the incongruent meaning. As such, baseline-level activation for the
incongruent condition would support this account. This is similar to the findings of Gorfein
(2001) in the seal-dolphin study described earlier.
2) Perceptual focus is expected to result in deeper processing.
Ferreira et al’s (2002) account of Good-Enough Representation supposes that deeper
processing only occurs when additional attention is given to the processing of a word. As such,
there are at least two possible outcomes for the focus manipulation in the present experiment:
focus may lead to slower RTs; or focus may lead to faster RTs. Each of these possibilities will
be discussed in turn.
The Activation-Selection Model predicts faster RTs under focus and priming only in the
congruent condition (as was the case with hypothesis 1). Evidence for a performance advantage
under focus was presented earlier, which showed that focusing one’s attention on a given word
results in more complete (i.e., deeper) processing of that word (A. J. S. Sanford, et al., 2006),
which is analogous to more activation. Focus would activate more features (deeper processing),
and so the activation threshold would be reached sooner under focus. For unfocused items,
participants would engage in Good-Enough processing.
The Structure-Building Framework, on the other hand, would predict slower RTs in the
focused condition and priming for both the congruent and incongruent conditions. In this view,
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the additional processing resulting from focusing requires cognitive resources. As such, full
suppression should not be seen in the incongruent condition because insufficient resources would
remain to apply the mechanism. Instead, priming should be evident in the incongruent condition.
3) The addition of cognitive load is expected to interfere with the application of
suppression.
If meaning selection in ambiguous words is an automatic, or passive, process that does
not require cognitive resources, then, even under load, no changes in performance are expected
since there should be no competing for cognitive resources. This would be in line with an
Activation-Selection account. Priming effects in the congruent condition should not be affected
by any additional cognitive load, since priming is well-established as an automatic process and
thus does not require cognitive resources. There is, however a possibility that reaction times in
each condition may be slightly slower under load due to task switching costs (remembering the
number and typing it in, or just making the judgment and lexical decisions). Of importance, each
condition should be equally affected by the load manipulation.

That is to say that the

incongruent, control, and congruent conditions should not be differentially affected by load.
If meaning selection is an active process, however, then performance should be
significantly affected, especially in the incongruent condition. RTs (overall) should be longer
under cognitive load because, from a Structure-Building Framework, meaning selection requires
cognitive resources (Gernsbacher, 1993).

Such a decline in performance under increased

cognitive load has been demonstrated in numerous studies (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1980;
Engle, 2002). Additionally, suppression should not occur under load because of insufficient
resources, so priming should be evident in the incongruent condition under load.
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Measuring the WM capacity may additionally shed some light on the question of whether
retrieving the meaning of an ambiguous word is automatic (i.e., does not require cognitive
resources) as suggested by Gorfein and colleagues’ Activation-Selection account, or whether it is
cognitively demanding as purported by Gernsbacher’s Structure-Building account.

For the

present set of studies, the Aospan task, which uses letters and simple math problems to gauge
memory span, will be used (this task will be described in detail in the Materials section). The
Structure-Building Framework would predict a stronger effect of load for low-Aospan
participants (because they have fewer cognitive resources to start off) and on incongruent trials,
as outlined above. The Activation-Selection Model would predict that conditions would not be
differentially affected by Aospan.
The present dissertation examines these questions in three experiments. In Experiment 1,
a standard version of the experiment is administered, manipulating the congruency of the
homograph meaning (congruent, incongruent) and comparing performance in these conditions to
a baseline control condition. Experiment 2 additionally manipulates perceptual focus and
Experiment 3 adds cognitive load by way of a digit recall task.
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CHAPTER 2 PRELIMINARY STUDY 1A: WORD ASSOCIATIONS
Objective
The traditionally used word association norms (e.g., Twilley, Dixon, Taylor, & Clark,
1994) are quite old, and related to this, the participant population available at Wayne State
University is less homogeneous than that on which the norms are based. Mainly for these
reasons, new word associations were obtained from the local student population.
Method
Participants
There were a total of 101 participants who provided word associations in this experiment.
All were Wayne State undergraduate students taking at least one Psychology course.
Participation was rewarded with extra credit which the student could apply to any Psychology
course that allowed it.
Materials
Homographs were selected from published sources including Twilley, Dixon, Taylor, and
Clark (1994) and Rodd, Gaskell, and Marslen-Wilson (2002). Words for which more than two
meanings were elicited with little effort on the part of the researcher were removed. Duplicate
words were also removed, resulting in 220 homograph words.
Procedures
Participants signed up for this online study via Wayne State’s research participation
system (SONA). Participants were instructed to type in the first word that came to mind for each
of the words in the list, and not to worry about proper spelling.
Results and Discussion
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Responses were screened by participant and revealed no obvious deviations from
expectations (e.g., no participant responded with the same word throughout or constantly made
irrelevant responses).

Obvious typographical errors (e.g., doctior) were corrected by the

researcher and made up only a small proportion of the collected responses. Words with lessobvious typographical errors or those that could not be deciphered were discarded. For each
homograph, participants’ responses were categorized as related to either of the two meanings or,
if this could not be determined (because of an ambiguous response or uncertainty as to the
relationship between the given word and either targeted meanings), to an “other” meaning.
Identical responses were then counted and rank-ordered to obtain the best associates for each
homograph. Words with more than 10% of responses in the “other” were discarded. This is
especially important because if a word elicits more than the two intended meanings or if there is
a chance that the meaning of that word is ambiguous in any unexpected way (e.g., bat often
elicited a response of man for ‘Batman’), the proposed manipulation may be unsuccessful.
The two most frequently-occurring associates for each of the homograph’s two meanings
were retained. There were a few exceptions to this, however. If the most associated response
was a homograph or an ambiguous word, or if the associate referred to a brand name, then the
next most frequent associate was retained. In some instances, no words were elicited during the
association task related to one of the meanings (e.g., the doctor meaning of quack). In these
cases, the most commonly occurring associate in the literature was used.

Finally, some

associates were provided for more than one homograph. These homographs were discarded
unless another associate with approximately equal frequency was provided. This resulted in 54
homographs, each with 4 associated words: 2 for each meaning.
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CHAPTER 3 PRELIMINARY STUDY 1B: STIMULI
Objective
Working from the words obtained from Preliminary Study 1a, a new set of stimuli was
created. The primary objective was to ensure that target groups were equal on characteristics
such as length, frequency, orthographic neighborhood size, and concreteness. These variables
are described in the Materials section below. Concreteness ratings are available from MRC
Psycholinguistic Database (Coltheart, 1981) but because many of the critical stimuli were not
available there, these ratings were obtained from the student population.
Method
Participants
One hundred Wayne State University undergraduates provided concreteness ratings for
the words. Again, participation was rewarded with extra credit that the student could apply to
any Psychology course that allowed it.
Materials
The entire set of words presented included all of the words retained from Study 1a
(homographs and associates) and several hundred unrelated words. These unrelated words were
rated in order to be matched to the critical stimuli. Approximately 950 words were presented to
participants.
The characteristics described below were obtained in order to match the stimuli across
the three conditions (congruent, incongruent and control).

Length refers to the number of

characters in the grapheme and was calculated using the Length feature of Excel. HAL word
frequencies (Lund & Burgess, 1996) are based on a corpus of 131 million words. As published
in Balota et al. (2007) the English Lexicon Project (ELP) has HAL frequencies ranging from 0
to 23,099,033 (M=10,778.67; SD=192,226.37).
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Orthographic neighborhood size refers to the number of orthographic neighbours of a
given target word. An orthographic neighbour is a word that can be created from the target word
by changing only one letter with all other letters remaining in their original positions (Coltheart,
Davelaar, Jonasson, & Besner, 1977).
Procedures
Ratings were obtained online and participants signed up through the research
participation system. Participants were asked to rate the concreteness of the entire set of words
in one sitting that was divided into multiple blocks. The order of both block and words within
each block was randomized. Participants were provided with a definition of concreteness prior
to beginning the rating task. This definition was based on the one provided by on
www.chompchomp.com (Simmons, 2010), a grammar website intended to be also easily
understood by students. The definition provided to participants was:
A word that is concrete will typically register on your 5 senses (hearing, smell,
taste, touch, sight). Puppy is an example of a concrete noun because you can see
it, touch it, smell it, etc. A word that is abstract will typically not be detectable by
the senses. An example of an abstract noun is bravery: it has no color, size,
shape, sound, odor, flavor, or texture- it has no quality that you can see, hear,
smell, taste, or touch. You will provide a rating for each word you see from 1
(very abstract) to 10 (very concrete).
Results and Discussion
Obtained ratings were thoroughly screened by examining frequency counts and
distributions. Subsequently, 20 participants were discarded for various violations such as severe
range restriction (e.g., most or all ratings were between 3 and 6) or skewness (e.g., most or all
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ratings were 10), bimodal distributions (e.g., most ratings were either 3 or 6) or completely flat
distributions (e.g., each number was used with equal frequency to rate the items). This high
discard rate can be partly explained by the difference between online and in-person participation
whereby students are less likely to perform as well online (Barenboym, Wurm, & Cano, 2010).
The remaining values were averaged and used for the analyses described below. Concreteness
ratings were transformed to normalize them (reflection and square root). Satisfactory normality
was confirmed subsequent to this transformation by visual inspection of histograms and Q-Q
norm plots.
The data obtained from this preliminary study (and Preliminary Study 1a) were used to
create and match the stimuli used in the present series of experiments. The conditions of interest
in these studies are the Congruent, Incongruent, and Unrelated conditions.

In each trial,

participants are shown a homograph paired with a word related to one of its meanings. On this
word pair, participants perform a semantic judgment task. After a 1000 ms delay, they are
shown a single word on which they perform a lexical decision task. These lexical decision
responses are the primary focus of this investigation.
There are three types of trials: Congruent (where the meaning elicited in both tasks is the
same), Incongruent (where the two meanings differ), and Control (where the meaning in the
lexical decision is unrelated to either meaning of the homograph).

Words in these three

conditions were matched so that they did not differ in length (F(2,159) = .310, p = .734), logged
frequency (F(2,159) = 1.560, p = .213), number of orthographic neighbors (F(2,159) = 1.186, p =
.308), and the transformed ratings (F(2,159) = 1.575, p = .210). Additionally, the words that are
paired with the homograph during the judgment task (i.e., those that activate the appropriate
meaning and the unrelated controls) were also matched to each other so that they did not differ
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on length (F(2,159) = 1.40, p = .250), logged frequency (F(2,159) = 2.06, p = .131), number of
orthographic neighbors (F(2,159) = 1.11, p = .331), and transformed concreteness ratings
(F(2,159) = 2.025, p = .135).
Some studies have also reported differences between nouns and verbs in lexical decision
times (e.g., Rösler, Streb, & Haan, 2001; Tyler, Russel, Fadili, & Moss, 2001). These results can
sometimes be attributed to imageability differences between word classes (Bird, Howard, &
Franklin, 2000). To ensure that this possible difference in response times to nouns and verbs will
not affect group performance in the present experiments, the critical stimuli used in the lexical
decision task contained approximately equal proportions of nouns (Dominant 76%; Subordinate
72%, and Unrelated 74%) and verbs (Dominant 15%; Subordinate 17%, and Unrelated 17%)
with other word classes making up the remaining cases. Lexical decision nonwords were also
matched to their word counterparts on length (t(268) = .335, p = .738) and number of
orthographic neighbors (t(268) = .707, p = .480).
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CHAPTER 4 EXPERIMENT 1
Objective
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to assess whether a dampening of activation occurs
during the ambiguity resolution process and whether this process is active (i.e., requires
cognitive resources). For each trial, participants were first shown a word pair− in critical trials,
the first word was a homograph and the second provided context to elicit meaning selection for
that homograph (e.g., spade- ace) or an unrelated control word. On this word pair, participants
made a relatedness judgment to indicate whether the words were semantically related. Following
this response, another letter string appeared, on which participants performed a lexical decision.
The critical items used for the lexical decision task were either related to the same meaning of
the homograph presented in the previous judgment trial, related to the other meaning of the
homograph presented in the judgment trial, or not related to either meaning (a baseline or control
condition). Congruent and incongruent trials (different homograph meanings between the two
tasks in the trial) were compared to the baseline/control condition.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through Wayne State University’s Psychology Research
Participation System (SONA). Participants were given extra credit for their participation. A
total of 63 participated: 12 males (19%) and 51 females (81%). Ages ranged from 18 to 41 (M =
20.70). Their Aospan (Automated Operation Span) scores ranged from 3-75 items (M = 43.08);
this measure will be described in detail below.
Materials
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Computer.

A set of 3 laptop computers were used to present the experiment to

participants. Each computer had a 12-inch color monitor, a keyboard, and built-in mouse. Each
computer was running Windows XP and was located inside a sound-attenuating booth to cancel
out noise and minimize distractions. Inquisit v.3.0.5.0 (Inquisit, 2011) was used to program and
run this experiment. Computers were all on mute and the resolution and other display properties
were the same on all machines.
Stimuli.

The stimuli from Preliminary Study 1b were divided into 6 experimental

versions, resulting in each of the 54 homographs occurring in each of the 3 conditions:
congruent, incongruent, and control. Each homograph was presented in lowercase (except in the
focus condition, which will be described in the Procedure section of Experiment 2) and appeared
only once in each list. Each participant was presented with 2 lists for a total of 270 trials. In
each list, there were 135 trials divided into critical stimuli (n = 54) and fillers (n = 81). Critical
trials consisted of 20 congruent, 20 incongruent, and 14 control trials. There were two types of
fillers: some were “no” response fillers to offset all of the “yes” responses of the critical trials for
the lexical decision task (i.e., 54 unrelated word pairs with nonwords for the lexical decision
task); the others are “no” response fillers to offset all of the “yes” responses of the critical trials
for the judgment task (i.e., the 54 nonword items above plus an additional 27 unrelated word
pairs with an unrelated word for the lexical decision task). The breakdown of trial types is
displayed in Table 1.
Although repetition of items would allow for greater statistical power given the small
number of items available, it may not be ideal. Because each homograph was seen twice by
participants it is not certain whether a few dozen intervening trials and a WM task (Aospan)
would be enough to negate any possible priming effect in the present study. In an ideal scenario,
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one would want an exactly equal proportion of related and unrelated filler items in the judgment
task and an equal number of words and nonwords in the lexical decision task. The closest match
possible was a 60:40 split (where 40% of trials in the judgment task were related and 40% of the
lexical decision tasks were nonword).

The necessity for this imperfect proportion was

determined in part by the complexity of the task (having to alternate between the judgment and
lexical decision tasks within each trial) and also the maximum number of trials during which
participants would perform optimally. There is ample evidence that students’ attention spans are
between 15 and 20 minutes (Hoover, 2006; Johnstone & Percival, 1976; Middendorf & Kalish,
1996). Based on this, the present methodology was developed so that each section of the
experiment (i.e., each block of trials and the Aospan task) would take approximately 15-20
minutes to complete. In order to have a fully balanced experiment, an additional 27 fillers in
each of the 2 blocks would have had to be added where the words were related in the judgment
task and the lexical decision is on a nonword. This would have increased participants’ total
number of trials to almost 330; it doesn’t seem reasonable to expect participants to diligently
participate in that many trials. Numerous researchers have reported effects of biased lists for
strategy use on a number of tasks (e.g., Bodner & Mulji, 2010; Frost, Katz, & Bentin, 1986;
Klapp, 2007; Tweedy, Lapinski, & Schvaneveldt, 1977), but these differences have typically
been shown for a far more extreme bias (e.g., 80:20) than the one found in the present
dissertation.
WM Measure. The Aospan was used to measure WM capacity (Figure 1). Unsworth et
al.

(2005) have adapted the traditional experimenter-administered Ospan task into to an

automated, mouse-driven, letter recognition version. In this version, letters are used rather than
words because word knowledge or familiarity (i.e., word frequency) has been shown to influence
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the measure (Engle, Nations, & Cantor, 1990). Another advantage of the Aospan is that it uses
each individual’s mean time (+ 2.5 SD) for completing the practice math problem as the
maximum time allowed to solve the math problems during the WM assessment portion of the
task. The trial times out and considers it an error if the participant exceeds this time on a given
math problem.
The Aospan is composed of four sections: a letter recognition practice block, a math
problem solving practice block, a combined letter recognition and math problem practice block
and the final test phase (which is again a combination of letter recognition and math problems).
In the first section (letter recognition practice), two to three letters are shown one at a time (800
ms) and then a 12-letter matrix appears where each letter must be selected in the order in which it
appeared. A button labelled “blank” is also provided so that if one letter is forgotten, the other
letters are not recorded in the incorrect position. The second section (practice math problems) is
used to familiarize participants with the type of math problems that will be shown during the
experimental phase. A math problem is shown (e.g., (1*2) + 1 = ?) and participants are asked to
calculate the answer and then to click on the mouse to indicate that they are done solving the
problem. Following the presentation of each math problem, participants are shown a potential
answer and asked to indicate whether this is the correct answer of the preceding problem (“true”)
or not (“false”).
The final practice allowed participants to gain familiarity with the complete procedure
that they would encounter in the final phase (the actual WM measure). Here, participants are
shown a math problem, followed by the response prompt (potential answer and “true” and
“false” buttons) and then a letter. A series of two to three sets are shown before requiring the
recall of the letters via the 12-letter matrix. Following these three practice sets, the experimental
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set begins and follows the procedure of this third practice. In the test trials, the sets are longer
than during the practice trials and range from three to seven items.
Participants are provided with detailed instructions during this task and provided an
opportunity to ask questions at each stage. They are also instructed to complete the task as
quickly as possible and to maintain an accuracy level of at least 85% on the math tasks.
Feedback is provided for each trial (including the experimental trials) and during the critical set,
a running mean accuracy is additionally displayed to participants.
At the conclusion of the task, the experimenter is presented with 5 scores: the absolute
score (sum of all trials where all letters were recognized in the correct order), the total number
correct (sum of all the correctly recalled letters in their correct position), the total number of
errors on the math task and a breakdown of these errors: the number of errors that were “forced”
because the upper time-limit was reached; and the number of accuracy errors, which are
incorrect responses given on the math problems.
Procedures
Participants were tested individually in Industrial Acoustics Company sound-attenuating
booths. After reading an information sheet, they were seated approximately 45 cm from the
computer and the instructions for the task were read to them from the computer monitor,
stressing the importance of completing the task as quickly and accurately as possible.
Participants were informed that they would see two types of alternating trials: the first would be
a word pair and the second a single word. When they saw a word pair, their task was to indicate
whether the two words were related and when they saw the single word their task was to indicate
whether it was a real English word. Both of these yes/no responses were to be indicated using
the two mouse buttons with left meaning “no” and right meaning “yes.” These response prompts
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were displayed on the screen during the experiment. The experimenter remained nearby while
the participants complete the 30 practice trials. If the participant had no questions, they were
monitored from outside the booth (through a window) for the duration of the experiment. Figure
2 illustrates a trial.
After the first 135 trials, participants completed the demographic questionnaire (age,
gender, handedness, major, and race/ethnicity) and the Aospan task, both of which were
completed on the computer. Following these tasks, another 10 practice items were presented,
followed by the other 135 trials.
Data Analysis
Data were analyzed using SPSS. Outliers were removed prior to conducting analyses.
This accounted for 2.90% of the judgment RTs (below 400 ms and above 2.5 SDs above the
mean) and 2.83% of the lexical decision RTs (below 250 ms and above 2.5 SDs above the
mean). Data were normalized using a log (base 10) transformation. Subsequently, histograms
and QQ plots of both distributions (Judgment and LD data) showed adequately normal
distributions to proceed. Examining the means of each cell by block showed the same pattern
(though Block 1 was a little slower and a little less accurate), so both blocks were combined for
the reported analyses.
A repeated measures ANCOVA was the primary analysis used for RTs as well as for
accuracy (Lunney, 1970).

Any participant that had an empty cell (i.e., had no remaining

responses in a particular condition subsequent to data cleaning) was excluded from the analyses.
In this experiment, there were 2 such cases, reducing the total participants from 63 to 61.
Responses to the semantic relatedness judgment task (RT and error) and to the LD task (RT and
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error) will be discussed, though RTs in the lexical decision task are the primary interest of the
present investigation. Each set of analyses is described in turn below.
Results and Discussion
Lexical Decisions
Reaction Times. Only correct responses following a correct judgment response were
included in the analyses.

An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for Condition (control,

incongruent, congruent) was conducted with Aospan score as the covariate (Table 2). Condition
(F (2, 118) = 9.62, p < .001, ɳp2 = .14) was significant but the continuous covariate of Aospan
score (F (1, 59) = .30, p = .586) was not.
All pairwise comparisons for Condition were significant using a Bonferroni correction.2
There was evidence of priming since both the congruent and incongruent conditions were
significantly faster than the control (t(60) = 7.97, p < .001; and t(60) = 5.49, p < .001,
respectively). Additionally, RTs in the congruent condition were significantly faster than the
incongruent condition (t(60) = 4.22, p < .001). These means are displayed in Table 3 and
illustrated in Figure 3.
The priming obtained in the congruent and incongruent conditions is in line with
performance advantages from a spreading activation account (Collins & Loftus, 1975), and
supports an exhaustive account of meaning activation. Both the Activation-Selection account
and the Structure-Building Framework predict this priming. Although there is no clear evidence
of suppression as defined by Gernsbacher (below-baseline activation), since the control and
incongruent condition were also significantly different from one another, one can speculate that
the alternate meaning of the homograph was activated but that the activation was reduced or that
the initial activation was not as strong as in the congruent condition. Experiments 2 and 3 may
2

New significance cut-off value for p is now .016.
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shed some light as to whether an additional mechanism was employed to reduce the activation in
the incongruent condition.
Accuracy. Again, only responses following a correct judgment response were included
in the analyses. An ANCOVA for Condition (control, incongruent, congruent) was conducted
with Aospan score as the covariate (Table 4).

Because the assumption of sphericity was

violated, Table 5 shows the adjusted values (Huynh-Feldt; Leech, Barrett & Morgan, 2011).
Means are displayed in Table 5. Condition (F (2, 103) = 3.69, p < .05, ηp2 = .059) and Aospan
score (F (1, 59) = 5.60, p < .05, ηp2 = .087) were both significant. Pairwise comparisons3
revealed significant differences between control and congruent (t(60) = 4.49, p < .001, with
congruent being significantly more accurate), and incongruent and congruent (t(60) = 4.53, p <
.001, with congruent being significantly more accurate). The difference between incongruent
and control was not significant (t(60) = 1.22, p = .228). This pattern does mirror the RT data,
with the best performance in the congruent condition, followed by the incongruent condition and
the worst performance in the control condition. As such, there does not appear to be a speedaccuracy trade-off in these data.
To probe the effect of Aospan on accuracy, Aospan scores were divided following
Gernsbacher and Faust’s (1991a) procedure, which compares the top and bottom thirds of the
distribution (high and low group, respectively) and sets aside those in the middle. The effect of
Aospan was significant in this follow-up analysis (F (1, 33) = 4.32, p < .05, ηp2 = .116) and
showed significantly more accurate performance by the high-Aospan group (M = 97.93, SEM =
.369) compared to the low-Aospan group (M =95.63, SEM = .813). This suggests that the
process of ambiguity resolution is not completely automatic and hints at an effect of cognitive

3

Bonferroni correction adjusted the p value to .016.
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resources, supporting the necessity of a suppression mechanism for ambiguity resolution as per
the Structure-Building Framework account.
Relatedness Judgments
Reaction Times. Since the congruent and incongruent conditions both contained the
same items in the judgment task (i.e., the congruent or incongruent manipulation did not occur
until the lexical decision task), they were combined into a “related” condition to compare to the
control (now “unrelated”) condition. An ANCOVA was performed for this new Condition with
Aospan score as the covariate. There was no significant effect of condition (F (1, 59) = .581, p =
.449) or the Aospan covariate (F (1, 6457) = 10.47, p < .01, ηp2 = .002). Although differences
might be expected, with participants responding to related word pairs more quickly than to
unrelated word pairs (e.g., Gadsby et al. (2008)), this difference did not reach significance.
Means were in the expected direction for this possibility, however, with related words showing a
faster mean reaction time (1110ms) than unrelated words (1123ms).
Accuracy. An ANCOVA was performed for Condition (related, unrelated), with Aospan
as a covariate. Again, there was no effect of Condition (F (1, 59) = .426, p = .516) or Aospan (F
(1, 59) = 2.05, p = .157) and no interactions were significant.

The expectation of better

performance for the related words did not reach significance in these data, but means were in the
expected direction: related was more accurate (84.44%) than unrelated (82.62%). This, combined
with the slightly faster RTs, suggests that there is a trend towards better performance for related
words compared to unrelated words. Additionally, these data suggest that there is no speedaccuracy trade-off and that participants truly are following the instructions to respond as quickly
and as accurately as possible.
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CHAPTER 5 EXPERIMENT 2
Focus Effects Overview
It is possible that different levels of processing could result in different ambiguity
resolution strategies. For example, deeper processing (rather than Good-Enough processing
(Ferreira, et al., 2002)) of the context word in the pair could either serve to highlight the
ambiguous nature of the homograph or result in an easier selection of meaning since that
meaning would be more strongly activated. In this second experiment, uppercase letters were
used to invoke perceptual focus and examine how lexical ambiguities are resolved.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through Wayne State University’s Psychology Research
Participation System (SONA). Participants were given extra credit for their participation. A
total of 123 participated: 48 males (39%) and 75 females (61%). Ages ranged from 18 to 49 (M
= 20.97). Their Aospan scores ranged from 0-75 items (M = 39.47).
Materials
The lists from Experiment 1 were used. Additionally, focus was manipulated so that the
context word that accompanied the homograph could either be focused (uppercase) or not
focused (lowercase). Across all lists, each homograph appeared as both focused and unfocused
for each of the three conditions– congruent, incongruent, and control. This resulted in 12
experimental lists.
Procedures
The same procedures described in Experiment 1 were followed.
illustrated in Figure 4.
Data Analysis

A focused trial is
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Data were analyzed using SPSS. Outliers were removed prior to conducting analyses.
This accounted for 3.66% of the judgment RTs (below 400 ms and above 2.5 SDs above the
mean) and 2.98% of the lexical decision RTs (below 250 ms and above 2.5 SDs above the
mean). Data were normed using a log (based 10) transformation. QQ plots and histograms
showed adequately normal distributions to proceed. Examining the means of each cell by block
showed the same pattern (though Block 1 was a little slower and a little less accurate), so both
blocks were combined for the reported analyses.
A repeated measures ANCOVA was the primary analysis used for RTs as well as for
accuracy (Lunney, 1970).

All participants provided data for each condition (N = 123).

Responses to the semantic relatedness judgment task (RT and error) and to the LD task (RT and
error) will be discussed, though RTs in the lexical decision task are the primary interest of the
present investigation. Each set of analyses is described in turn below.
Results and Discussion
Lexical Decisions
Reaction Times. Only correct responses following a correct judgment response were
included in the analyses. An ANCOVA for Condition (control, incongruent, congruent) and
Focus (focused, unfocused) with Aospan score as the covariate was conducted (Table 6 with
Huynh-Feldt adjusted values where appropriate).

Mean RTs are displayed in Table 7 and

illustrated in Figure 5. The only significant effect was that of Condition (F (2, 242) = 6.99, p <
.01, ηp2 = .06). Pairwise comparisons for Condition (using the adjusted Bonferroni p of .016)
showed evidence of priming for both the congruent and incongruent conditions. Control (M =
749, SEM = 11.72) was significantly slower than both congruent (M = 670, SEM = 9.66, t(122) =
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10.91, p < .001) and incongruent (M = 700, SEM = 10.32, t(122) = 5.63, p < .001). Congruent
and incongruent were also significantly different from each other (t(122) = 4.14, p < .001).
The results obtained here mirror those of Experiment 1 with priming for the congruent
and incongruent conditions and different levels of activation in these conditions. Perceptually
focussing the context word (i.e., deeper processing) did not result in significant differences in
performance and suggest that employing such a structure does not alter the initial (and perhaps
automatic) pattern of activation for homographs. Experiment 3 examines whether performance
changes under cognitive load.
Accuracy. An ANCOVA for Condition (control, incongruent, congruent) and Focus
(focused, unfocused) and with Aospan score as the covariate was conducted. Because the
assumption of sphericity was violated for Condition, the Huynh-Feldt adjusted values are
reported in Table 8 (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2011). See Table 9 for means and SEMs.
Condition was the only significant variable in the model (F (2, 242) = 7.63, p < .01, ηp2 = .06).
The control condition was the least accurate overall. This lower performance in the control
condition mirrors the RT data and serves as further evidence that no speed-accuracy trade-off
occurred.

More generally, there was no effect of focus in these data either. No specific

predictions had been made related to accuracy, though it seems intuitively pleasing that, like the
RT performance, the accuracy results show the worst performance in the control condition,
suggesting a slight advantage for processing words that are semantically related.
Relatedness Judgments
Reaction Times. An ANCOVA with Condition (related, unrelated) and Focus (focused,
unfocused) and with Aospan score as the covariate.

There were no significant effects or

interactions. Again, the expectation might be that participants would respond to related words
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more quickly than unrelated words, agreeing with a spreading activation account (Collins &
Loftus, 1975). The mean RTs obtained here are in line with what would be predicted by this
account (related 1112ms ; unrelated 1119ms). Additionally, focused trials were expected to have
longer RTs because of the need for deeper processing. The trend for these data are in that
direction, with focused trials having longer reaction times (1121ms) than unfocused trials
(1109ms), but again this is only a trend, and not a significant effect.
Accuracy.

An ANCOVA with Condition (related, unrelated) and Focus (focused,

unfocused) and with Aospan score as the covariate was performed. Condition (F (1, 121) =
10.27, p < .01, ηp2 = .078) and Aospan (F (1, 121) = 4.22, p < .05, ηp2 = .034) were the only
significant effects. Participants responded to unrelated words significantly less accurately (M =
94.11, SEM = .994) than to related words (M = 97.55, SEM = .405). When the Aospan covariate
effect was probed with an ANOVA using the top and bottom thirds of the distribution, this effect
was no longer significant (p = .224), although those with low Aospan scores tended to be less
accurate (M = 94.80, SEM = 1.20) than those with high scores (M = 96.86, SEM = 1.18). This
trend in the data is in line with the idea that encountering (and ultimately resolving) an
ambiguous word requires cognitive resources. This finding appears to give partial support to the
Structure-Building Framework, since it posits the necessity to mobilize cognitive resources in
order to apply the mechanism of suppression. The trend in the present data may be the initial
stage of this increased requirement of cognitive resources.
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CHAPTER 6 EXPERIMENT 3
Cognitive Load Overview
If ambiguity resolution requires cognitive resources (e.g., to apply suppression, as
suggested by Gernsbacher’s group), then one would expect performance to suffer under
cognitive load.

To examine this possibility, this experiment added a secondary task of

remembering a 5-digit number while performing the task.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through Wayne State University’s Psychology Research
Participation System (SONA). Participants were given extra credit for their participation. A
total of 124 participated: 35 males (28%) and 89 females (71%). Ages ranged from 18 to 464 (M
= 21.67). Their Aospan scores ranged from 0-75 items (M = 40.43).
Materials
The same stimulus set was used as for Experiment 1. Before half of the trials, a 5-digit
number was presented. This list of number stimuli was created using Excel’s random number
generation feature. Across all lists, each homograph appeared as both loaded and unloaded for
each of the three conditions– congruent, incongruent, and control). Load was also added to half
of the filler trials. This resulted in 12 lists.
Procedures
The procedure was similar to those of the previous two experiments.

The only

modification was related specifically to the addition of the load manipulation (illustrated in
Figure 6). On the load trials, participants were shown a 5-digit number and asked to retain it
4

One participant was removed based on age. The participant who was removed was 63 years old, which is clearly
an outlier since the next oldest in this sample is 46. Further, doing so resulted in this sample mirroring those of the
Focus and Standard versions.

46
until after the judgment and lexical decision task and recall it on a final screen. Unloaded trials
had a blank screen in the place of the digits. The digits or the blank screen was displayed for
2000 ms. After the lexical decision task, a textbox appeared and remained on the screen until
participants typed in the number or simply pressed “enter” if there was no number preceding the
trial.
Data Analysis
Data were analyzed using SPSS. Outliers were removed prior to conducting analyses.
Outliers accounted for 3.75% of the judgment RTs (below 400 ms and above 2.5 SDs above the
mean) and 3.64% of the lexical decision RTs (below 250 ms and above 2.5 SDs above the
mean).

Following log (base 10) transformations, both distributions appeared normal when

inspecting the QQ plots and histograms. Examining the means of each cell by block showed the
same pattern (though Block 1 was a little slower and a little less accurate), so both blocks were
combined for the reported analyses.
A repeated measures ANCOVA was the primary analysis used for RTs as well as for
accuracy (Lunney, 1970). Only trials where the correct number was recalled were used. The
rationale behind this decision is that this is the only way to know for certain that participants
were actually trying to remember the number and thus ensure the success of the manipulation.
Any participant with an empty cell subsequent to data cleaning was excluded from the analyses.
In this experiment, there were 44 such cases, reducing the total participants from 121 to 77 5.
A discussion of this and possible explanation for the large number of participants that
were removed from these analyses will be attempted in the next chapter. Responses to the
semantic relatedness judgment task (RT and error) and to the LD task (RT and error) will be
5

In a parallel analysis, 23 of the 44 deleted subjects were recovered (those that were only missing 1 condition
mean). This was done by replacing the missing mean with the cell mean, but this analysis did not shed any
additional light on the research questions posed.
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discussed, though RTs in the lexical decision task are the primary interest of the present
investigation.
Results and Discussion
Lexical Decisions
Reaction Times. Only correct responses following a correct judgment response were
included in the analyses. An ANCOVA for Condition (control, incongruent, congruent) and
Load (load, no load) with Aospan score as a covariate was conducted (Table 10, with the HuynhFeldt values where appropriate). Means are displayed in Table 11 and Figure 7. None of the
main effects or two-way interactions was significant, but the 3-way interaction between
Condition, Load, and Aospan was significant (F (2, 150) = 4.05, p < .05, ηp2 = .051).
To further examine the significant 3-way interaction obtained in these analyses,
ANOVAs were run separately for the top and bottom thirds of the Aospan distribution. This
revealed that the high-span participants were driving these effects as nothing was significant in
the low-Aospan participants (Figure 8, top panel), though the RTs trended in the expected
direction, with loaded trials taking longer than unloaded trials and the slowest performance
occurring in the control condition. Although no significant effects emerged, it can be seen in
Figure 8 that the low-Aospan group (top panel) had higher RTs overall than the high-Aospan
group (bottom panel), as would be expected. In the high-Aospan analysis, both Load (F (1, 28)
= 6.67, p < .05, ηp2 = .323) and Condition (F (2, 28) = 6.33, p < .01, ηp2 = .311) are significant.
For the main effect of load, means are in the expected directions with no-load trials being
significantly faster (M = 712 ms, SEM = 41.29) than loaded trials (M = 809 ms, SEM = 48.70).
For the main effect of Condition, no pairwise comparisons were significant after the Bonferroni
correction (using the new p cut-off of .008). However, examining the means, both congruent (M
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= 715 ms) and incongruent (M = 710 ms) appear much faster than Control (M = 855 ms). These
differences likely did not reach significance because of the much smaller N in this analysis, since
only one third of the data are used to probe the significant 3-way analysis.
Additionally, there is a marginally significant Load x Condition interaction (F (2, 28) =
3.17, p = .058, ηp2 = .184). It is likely that this effect did not reach significance because of the
reduction in sample size, which resulted from Aospan being divided into thirds and this analysis
only using the top third. Looking at this interaction, the effect of cognitive load seems especially
evident in the control condition (Figure 8, bottom panel). Under no load, RT patterns mirror
previous versions (Experiment 1, and 2) with control having the longest RTs. Under load, this
pattern also holds, however the control condition is 150 ms slower than either congruent or
incongruent, a far greater different than the difference seen in Experiments 1 and 2. Said
differently, the priming found in the congruent and incongruent conditions may serve as a
protective factor for the effect of load in individuals with larger working memory capacity (i.e.,
high-Aospan group).
Accuracy. An ANCOVA for Condition (control, incongruent, congruent) and Load
(load, no load) with Aospan score as a covariate was conducted (Table 12). Means and SEMs
are displayed in Table 13. There were no significant effects, but the trend of the means does
seem to mirror the results of the other experiments, with greatest accuracy in the congruent
condition, and lowest accuracy in the control condition. This suggests there is no speed-accuracy
trade-off in this experiment, either. Furthermore, there was very little difference in accuracy
between loaded and unloaded trials (96% and 95%), suggesting that the load manipulation did
not affect accuracy in the lexical decision data.
Relatedness Judgments
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Reaction Times. An ANCOVA for Condition (related, unrelated) and Load (load, no
load) with Aospan score as a covariate was conducted. No main effects or interactions were
significant. Generally, however, participants responded to no-load trials faster (1406 ms) than to
loaded trials (1539ms). This trend makes sense given that in the loaded trials, working memory
is engaged in retaining the multi-digit number that was recently presented. Because of this
difference, the resulting relatedness decision does not appear to be entirely automatic. Although
the Structure-Building Framework makes no predictions about specifically when cognitive
resources begin to be engaged in the resolution process (i.e., when the suppression mechanism
begins to be applied), the trend found here related to slower responses in the loaded trials might
indicate that the suppression process begins quite soon after the word is encountered.
Accuracy. A Condition (related, unrelated) by Load (load, no load) ANCOVA with
Aospan score as the covariate was conducted. There were no significant effects, though the
means did show a trend in the expected direction with unrelated words being less accurate (M =
94.15, SEM = 1.63) than related words (M = 97.18, SEM = .844). This trend is intuitively
pleasing, as it appears to indicate that the spreading of activation between related words provides
an advantage in the processing of these words. Again, it appears that focus had little effect on
accuracy (no load 95%; load 96%).
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CHAPTER 7 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The overall reaction times were much faster for the lexical decision task compared to the
judgment task: Standard- 716 ms vs. 1116 ms; Focus- 607 ms vs. 1115 ms; Load- 807 ms vs.
1473 ms. This global difference makes sense given that the word/nonword distinction in the
lexical decision task is less subjective than the related/unrelated decision in the judgment task.
The judgment task data infrequently showed significant effects, but a semi-consistent
finding was of better performance (either RT or accuracy) for related words compared to
unrelated words. This is consistent with an account in which related items benefit from a
performance advantage due to spreading activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975). However, even
though the data do show consistent trends in this direction, since most of these effects were not
significant, it is not possible to make strong conclusions from these results. I therefore turn to a
discussion of the lexical decision RTs, which are of primary interest for this study.
Is There One Process (Activation) or Two (Suppression)?
The results provide partial support for Hypothesis 1, which predicted priming and some
form of suppression. The RT data in all three experiments show consistent evidence of priming
in both the congruent and incongruent conditions. Priming was expected for the congruent items
from a spreading activation account (Collins & Loftus, 1975) and according to both the
Structure-Building Framework and the Activation-Selection account. Past research (e.g., Onifer
& Swinney, 1981) has also reported priming for both meanings of a homograph compared to a
baseline control. Of perhaps greater importance, however, is that congruent and incongruent
reaction times were also significantly different from one another (except for in the load
experiment, which was predicted). This suggests that the initial automatic activation of these
semantically related words was reduced in the case of the incongruent words. This result is
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consistent with an exhaustive account of meaning activation followed by a secondary mechanism
(such as suppression). These results provide some support for Gernsbacher’s Structure-Building
Framework in that partial suppression was found. Although there was no evidence of full
suppression (below-baseline activation), there was less priming in the incongruent condition than
the congruent condition suggesting some suppression of the alternate homograph meaning.
Gorfein’s Activation-Selection account predicts no activation of the incongruent meaning; since
priming was found in most of the experiments reported herein, the results appear to refute this
account. Further support for the Structure-Building Framework came from the lack of
suppression found under load. This is because, under load, cognitive resources are allocated to
the secondary (i.e., digit) task, resulting in too few resources remaining to apply suppression to
the unintended meaning. As such, under load, suppression did not occur.
Overall, the literature consistently reports some kind of disruption in the representation of
the inappropriate meaning of a homograph. However, Gorfein (2001) reported that paradigms
using a single presentation of the homograph (as was the case here) frequently report near
baseline performance whereas two presentations tend to show below-baseline performance (i.e.,
clear suppression). However, in the Load version, congruent and incongruent were no different
from one another, suggesting that under this increased need for cognitive resources (the
additional requirement in some of the trials of remembering the number and also, perhaps, taskswitching costs), there aren’t enough cognitive resources remaining to apply suppression to the
inappropriate meaning, which is why it was not significantly different from the congruent
condition.
Additionally, previous empirical research related to Gernsbacher’s Structure-Building
Framework focused primarily on sentence contexts rather than on word-pair presentation as was

52
done here. There might not be a clear or full suppression effect (i.e., below-baseline RTs for the
incongruent condition) because without the stronger context provided by a sentence, the full
mechanism of suppression may not be necessary for meaning selection. In such cases, meaning
selection may occur based on other factors such as frequency, or both meanings may remain
partially active even after the selection of a meaning. Evidence for this last possibility (that both
meanings may remain partially activated when a word is used as context) is reflected in the
consistent finding of priming in the incongruent condition. As such, evidence in support of the
Structure Building Framework was provided, to varying degrees, in each of the three
experiments.
Does Perceptual Focus Affect Ambiguity Resolution?
The second hypothesis, which predicted perceptual focus would result in deeper
processing, was not supported by the data. Specifically, results did not indicate faster activation
times for perceptually focused words or priming only for the congruent condition, as expected
from an Activation-Selection account. Additionally, the Structure-Building Framework’s
prediction of slower reaction times for focused items and priming for both congruent and
incongruent meanings were not entirely supported.
In the Focus version, responses to focused items were only slightly slower than to
unfocused items (though this difference was not significant). However, processing appeared to
mirror results of the Standard experiment and did not lead to different processing during the
ambiguity resolution task. As such, one might conclude that perceptually focusing the context of
an ambiguous word does not provide processing advantages during the resolution process, nor
does it hinder this process. However, it is also possible that perceptual focus may not have been
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a strong enough manipulation to require additional processes and a stronger focus manipulation
(e.g., syntactic focus) may be required to find significant effects.
Does Cognitive Load Affect Ambiguity Resolution?
The data provide evidence in support of the third hypothesis, which predicted that
increasing cognitive load would interfere with the application of suppression. Increasing the
processing requirements by adding cognitive load resulted in longer RTs. This slower
performance was expected if the ambiguity resolution process was not entirely automatic, and
therefore required cognitive resources, as is the case when suppression is applied. This finding is
counter to the predictions of the Activation-Selection Model, which proposes that processing is
automatic and thus should not be affected by an increase in cognitive load. Aospan also seemed
to have an effect on performance in the Standard and Load versions, with better performance by
the high-Aospan group, so that these participants with more cognitive resources performed either
more accurately (Standard) or faster (Load).
In the Load version, Aospan score was an important variable. Specifically, those with
low-Aospan scores (thus fewer cognitive resources) had higher RTs in all three conditions than
those with high-Aospan scores. The Structure-Building Framework predicts a larger effect for
low-Aospan participants, though it further predicts that the incongruent condition would be
especially affected by load, which it was not. Additionally, participants with high-Aospan scores
(many resources) were only affected by load in the control condition. This confirms that the
priming observed in the congruent and incongruent conditions is automatic and, unlike the
mechanism of suppression discussed above, activation does not require additional cognitive
resources.
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Taken together, these results support Gernsbacher’s proposal that a second mechanism is
required for ambiguity resolution and that this secondary mechanism requires cognitive
resources. So, although the activation mechanism responsible for the observed priming effects is
automatic and does not require cognitive resources, the ambiguity resolution process requires
more than activation alone: ambiguity resolution appears to also require some form of
suppression and this suppression process does make use of cognitive resources.
Because load affected performance, the Activation-Selection Model is not supported.
Instead, these results are more in line with the Structure-Building Framework, which purports
that cognitive resources are required to apply suppression in the ambiguity-resolution process.
An Updated Conceptualization of Word-level Ambiguity Resolution
The results of these three experiments together point to a slightly different
conceptualization of the process of ambiguity resolution than what is currently available in the
literature. Specifically, they suggest that partial suppression is occurring, rather than the full
suppression proposed by Gernsbacher’s group. How this occurs may not be as straightforward
as her framework would suggest.
For example, in the case of bark, the tree meaning is suppressed but the semantic
representation of the concept of tree remains accessible, because it is only weakly related to the
word bark. Only the tree meaning of bark is suppressed as it relates to that particular word (i.e.,
the link between the nodes, and not the nodes themselves). As such, when the homograph is
encountered again, that previously inappropriate incongruent meaning is difficult to access. This
explains why the finding of below-baseline activation (i.e., suppression) only consistently occurs
in dual-presentation paradigms. With a single presentation of the homograph, although the
“tree” meaning of bark may have been suppressed (i.e., that pathway), the concept of “tree” itself
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has not been suppressed, so that encountering the word leaf does not result in suppression, even
though it relates to the suppressed meaning. The lower activation in the incongruent condition
compared to the congruent condition results from the reduction in activation since that pathway
is now much weaker. In this way, activation and suppression may follow different rules. Figure
9 illustrates this proposal.
This modified conceptualization, therefore, can explain why dual-presentation paradigms
(presenting the homograph twice to assess meaning activation) find suppression effects whereas
single presentation paradigms typically do not. When the original encounter is focused, both of
the homograph’s meanings are more strongly activated, and, in an attempt to fully process the
stimulus, this activation may also spread to nearby nodes such as “leaf” and “cat”, increasing the
strength of those connections as well. Under load, the pattern would be similar to the one
illustrated in Figure 9 for the automatic process of activation (congruent condition), though for
the additional task of “suppressing” there are too few cognitive resources to efficiently complete
this task, so responses to the incongruent trials are slowed down.
It wouldn’t be very adaptive to fully suppress all access to a given meaning, even for a
relatively short period of time. This sentiment has been echoed by others such as Allport (1987)
and Nievas and Marì-Beffa (2002). The cognitive system may need to rapidly respond to some
ignored concept to successfully perform a task in the near future. So it wouldn’t make
evolutionary sense to completely limit the access to a given concept by fully suppressing it and
not having alternate routes to activating that meaning. This seems particularly fitting given the
preference given to responses to words with high “danger” ratings (Wurm, 2007). Humans are
programmed to be able to respond quickly to words, and evolutionarily adaptive words (those
that are useful or dangerous) are processed more quickly. For example, in a lexical decision task
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using words that had previously been rated for how dangerous they were for human survival,
Wurm (2007) showed that words rated high on dangerousness (e.g., blade, lion, thief) were
responded to faster, likely stemming for the evolutionary need to avoid danger in order to
survive. This preferential lexical access for words high on danger ratings has also been found in
memory experiments where a similar argument for the adaptive advantage of “dangerous” words
is also made (interested readers may refer to Nairne’s (2010) chapter on adaptive memory).
Limitations and Future Directions
One limitation of the present paradigm is that the design of the stimuli was not perfectly
orthogonal (i.e., where each possible combination of stimulus and response was presented). For
example, critical relatedness judgment pairs were never followed by a nonword on the lexical
decision task. This design shortcoming does not appear to have affected the present results.
Gadsby et al. (2008) used a similar paradigm with a fully orthogonal stimuli set and results
agreed with the present findings for the Condition variable: the longest lexical decision RTs were
in the control (or unrelated) condition, followed by the incongruent condition and the fastest RTs
were found in the congruent condition.
Another possible limitation is the greater number of participants who had to be deleted
from the Load analyses (because of missing data) compared to the Standard or Focus versions.
One possible explanation for this difference is that participants in this version of the experiment
differed in some way from the other two. This was examined as a possibility and no differences
were found in Aospan score or age (Table 14 and Table 15, respectively). The full range of
scores was represented in the Aospan task (0 to 75) and similar age ranges and means were
obtained in all three versions.
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Another possibility is that this is a byproduct of the much larger number of trials that had
to be removed (i.e., because the number was not correctly recalled). However, most of the
missing data occurred in the unloaded trials, so this does not appear to be a plausible explanation.
This is, of course, contrary to what would be expected, given that cognitive load should result in
a decrease in performance. If we assume that performance by low-span participants mirrors that
of someone under increased cognitive load, then Kossowska’s (2007) recent findings about
negative priming might be able to provide a partial explanation. She reports that low-span
individuals can temporarily increase performance to match that of high-span individuals, but a
reduction in this “boosted” performance occurs over time: at first, performance was no different
from high-span individuals, because those with low spans are able to use up their “reserve” of
cognitive resources. However, once these reserves were used up, performance was reduced and
low-span individuals performed worse than high-span individuals. Although this appears to be a
promising avenue to pursue for explaining the present difference, Kossowska’s study only had
18 trials in each block, so these effects may not be very long-lasting. Future research should
replicate the present experiments in order to better evaluate the plausibility of this explanation as
it pertains to ambiguous words. Furthermore, functional neuroimaging or ERP studies could be
used to further clarify the ambiguity resolution process. For example, the N400 of an ERP, which
has been attributed to meaning retrieval, might be used to shed some light on when a meaning is
selected for an ambiguous word and if the pattern of meaning-selection might suggest the
presence of a secondary mechanism.
Future studies should examine these findings in the context of sentences. Including both
the focus and load manipulations should confirm the prediction that clear suppression would
only be evident at the sentence-level. Additionally, this may shed some light regarding the
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strength of the focus manipulation and whether the sentence context would provide sufficient
(syntactic or linguistic) focus to lead to deeper processing and perhaps differential processing of
ambiguous words.
Additionally, cross-linguistic replication should be done to determine whether lexical
ambiguity is resolved differently either across languages or within a language by bilinguals,
whose cognitive system includes an additional level of complexity (the added representation of
the second language). This would have implications for models of language processing as it
would clarify whether similar mechanisms come into play for ambiguity resolution within and
across languages. It is possible that bilingual participants would demonstrate differences that
may be the result of generalized processing advantages of the bilingual cognitive system.
Because bilinguals are constantly suppressing the “other language”, they can be thought of as
expert suppressers, so they may be less affected by load.
These additional investigations may further assist in developing applied uses for this
knowledge such as computer models for language comprehension, and improved technology for
Google searches and online translators. The complexity of the human linguistic system is, in
most cases, beyond our conscious awareness and so it is disappointing when a Google search
results provide us with unrelated responses or when Babelfish inaccurately translates the text we
input. It seems evident from these two examples that translation software and Internet search
algorithms could still be greatly improved. The better we can understand how misunderstandings
occur and how ambiguities are deciphered and resolved, the better these systems will be able to
respond to human input. The restricted usefulness of these technologies at present limits
communication and, tangentially, the evolution of human progress.
Concluding Remarks
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A similar overall pattern was consistently found across all versions of the experiment, so
it appears to be a real pattern. It appears that there is a secondary process requiring cognitive
resources that comes into play to resolve word ambiguities. Perceptual focus did not affect
ambiguity resolution, but additional cognitive load resulted in the inability to apply suppression
for incongruent meanings. Although there is no clear evidence of suppression as defined by
Gernsbacher’s group (below-baseline activation in the incongruent condition), a consistent
pattern emerges: there is a reduction in priming for incongruent compared to congruent, so it
appears that the automatic activation is reduced by a suppression-like mechanism that also
requires cognitive resources to apply. It also appears that whatever process is involved in
ambiguity resolution does involve cognitive resources. Evidence for this came from the Load
version as well as some trends and effects involving Aospan.
Previous studies have focused on the ambiguity resolution process in “normal”
processing environments, with few giving any attention to alternate cognitive contexts. As such,
the present work fills an important gap in the literature because it examines how cognitive
contexts such as increased working memory load and perceptual focus affect the process of
ambiguity resolution.
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APPENDIX A TABLES
Table 1
Stimulus breakdown
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Table 2
Analysis of Covariance for Lexical Decision Reaction Time (ms)- Standard
Experiment

Source

df

F

ɳp2

p

.005

.586

Between subjects
Aospan

1

0.30

Error

59

Within subjects
Condition

2

9.62

.140

.000***

Condition x
Aospan

2

0.72

.012

.489

Error

118

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 3
Means and SEMs for Lexical Decision Reaction Times (ms)- Standard
Experiment

Control

Congruent

Incongruent

Mean

757.23

676.85

712.49

SEM

22.27

16.75

20.60
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Table 4
Analysis of Covariance for Lexical Decision Accuracy (% correct)- Standard
Experiment

Source

df

F

ɳp2

p

.087

.021*

Between subjects
Aospan

1

5.60

Error

59

Within subjects
Condition

1.75

3.69

.059

.034*

Condition x
Aospan

1.75

0.69

.012

.486

Error

103.25

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 5
Means and SEMs for Lexical Decision Accuracy (% correct)- Standard
Experiment

Control

Congruent

Incongruent

Mean

95.32

98.52

96.24

SEM

0.79

0.34

0.48
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Table 6
Analysis of Covariance for Lexical Decision Reaction Time (ms)- Focus Experiment

Source

df

F

ɳp2

p

.000

.984

Between subjects
Aospan
Error

1

0.00

121

Within subjects
Condition

1.89

6.99

.055

.001**

Focus

1

1.61

.013

.207

Condition x Aospan

2

1.34

.011

.265

Focus x Aospan

1

0.38

.003

.541

Condition x Focus

2

1.02

.008

.363

Condition x Focus x
Aospan

2

0.35

.003

.709

Error
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

242
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Table 7
Means and SEMs for Lexical Decision Reaction times (ms)- Focus
Experiment

Focused

Unfocused

Control

Congruent

Incongruent

Mean

742.92

683.57

704.41

SEM

16.09

13.82

14.88

Mean

755.2

656.99

693.98

SEM

17.08

13.45

14.35
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Table 8
Analysis of Covariance for Lexical Decision Accuracy (% correct)- Focus Experiment

Source

df

F

ɳp2

p

.030

.055

Between subjects
Aospan
Error

1

3.77

121

Within subjects
Condition

1.66

7.63

.059

.001**

Focus

1

0.14

.001

.710

Condition x Aospan

2

1.34

.011

.265

Focus x Aospan

1

0.12

.001

.727

Condition x Focus

1.91

0.03

.000

.968

Condition x Focus x
Aospan

1.91

0.07

.001

.929

Error

242

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p <
.001

68
Table 9
Means and SEMs for Lexical Decision Accuracy (% correct)- Focus
Experiment

Focused

Unfocused

Control

Congruent

Incongruent

Mean

93.76

97.79

96.58

SEM

1.04

0.41

0.90

Mean

94.45

97.30

96.24

SEM

1.05

0.55

0.85
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Table 10
Analysis of Covariance for Lexical Decision Reaction Time (ms)- Load Experiment

Source

df

F

ɳp2

p

.015

.291

Between subjects
Aospan

1

Error

75

1.13

Within subjects
Condition

2

0.06

.001

.945

Load

1

0.15

.002

.704

Condition x Aospan

2

1.38

.018

.255

Load x Aospan

1

1.86

.024

.177

1.88

1.95

.025

.149

2

4.05

.051

.019*

Condition x Load
Condition x Load x Aospan
Error
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

150
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Table 11
Means and SEMs for Lexical Decision Reaction times (ms)- Load
Experiment

Load

No Load

Control

Congruent

Incongruent

Mean

917.07

794.71

833.09

SEM

42.60

29.55

35.66

Mean

789.97

745.57

753.62

SEM

25.06

21.79

21.50
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Table 12
Analysis of Covariance for Lexical Decision Accuracy (% correct)- Load Experiment

Source

F

ɳp2

p

0.71

.009

.402

df

Between subjects
Aospan

1

Error

75

Within subjects
Condition

2

1.29

.017

.277

Load

1

0.34

.004

.564

Condition x Aospan

2

0.78

.010

.461

Load x Aospan

1

0.00

.000

.961

1.85

0.74

.010

.471

2

1.27

.017

.284

Condition x Load
Condition x Load x
Aospan
Error
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

150
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Table 13
Means and SEMs for Lexical Decision Accuracy (% correct)- Load
Experiment

Load

No Load

Control

Congruent

Incongruent

Mean

94.59

98.02

96.74

SEM

1.73

0.73

1.27

Mean

93.71

96.34

96.16

SEM

1.73

1.17

1.23
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Table 14
A Comparison of Aospan Scores Across Versions

Median

Mean

Quartile 1

Quartile 3

Minimum Minimum

Standard

45

43.08

32

55

6

75

Focus

42

39.47

28

50.5

0

75

Load

42

40.43

28

51

0

75

Overall

42.5

40.59

28.75

52

0

75

Unsworth et al.
(2005)

37.5

39.16

28

51

0

75
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Table 15
A Comparison of Age Across Versions

Mean

SEM

Minimum Maximum

Standard

20.70

0.475

17

41

Focus

21.97

0.431

17

49

Load

21.67

0.472

17

46
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APPENDIX B FIGURES

Figure 1. Aospan task. Adapted from Unsworth et al. (2005).
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Figure 2. Standard display of experiment.
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Figure 3. The effect of condition on lexical decision reaction times (ms). Error bars show
SEMs.
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Figure 4. Focused display of experiment.
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Figure 5. The effect of condition and focus on lexical decision reaction times (ms). Error bars
show SEMs.
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Figure 6. Memory load manipulation display of experiment.
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Figure 7. The effect of condition and load on lexical decision reaction times (ms). Error bars
show SEMs.
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Figure 8. The interaction of condition and load on lexical decision reaction times (ms) for lowAospan (top) and high-Aospan (bottom) groups.
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Figure 9. A possible conceptualization for the present results. Ellipses refer to words while
boxes refer to concepts. Notice that there are multiple connections to “tree.”
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APPENDIX C STIMULI (EXPERIMENTAL TRIALS)
Judgment Pair

Lexical Decision

Homograph

Meaning 1

Meaning 2

Meaning 1

Meaning 2

Control

arms
ball
bark
battery
board
bulb
cable
chest
china
coast
company
count
court
cricket
down
ear
fan
fence
game
grave
hard
letter
lobby
lock
log
miss
mold
mouse
novel
organ
park
patient
pen
pipe
pool
private
pupils

hands
base
dog
charger
plank
light
television
pain
asian
west
business
numbers
room
noisy
up
hear
air
picket
fun
death
soft
mail
hotel
key
cabin
america
green
trap
book
donor
bench
nurse
pencil
line
swim
public
eye

weapons
dance
tree
abuse
certified
flower
wire
treasure
cabinet
glide
friends
dracula
basketball
team
feather
corn
sports
sword
bird
serious
easy
alphabet
politics
hair
in
you
jello
computer
new
piano
car
calm
pig
smoke
table
soldier
student

long
bounce
cat
power
wood
lamp
guy
breast
country
sea
corporation
math
judge
chirp
low
drum
cool
gate
player
cemetery
rock
opener
entrance
door
burn
lady
fungus
cheese
read
heart
swings
hospital
ink
plumbing
summer
secret
dilate

war
belle
stump
assault
directors
tulip
cord
trunk
plates
drift
visitors
royalty
volleyball
inning
pillow
food
football
saber
turkey
severe
exam
write
government
bundle
out
sad
clay
pad
old
church
lot
wait
enclosure
tobacco
hall
army
teacher

zebra
sleep
hour
chubby
create
strong
had
prisoner
cradle
bend
about
bouquet
chevron
reply
kiss
come
drawer
poured
processed
whale
beard
ashes
alarm
finances
import
ask
hold
battle
snake
vinyl
more
machine
village
love
beast
rainbow
branch
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quack
race
racket
rare
ring
ruler
seal
sentence
shed
spade
staff
star
temple
terminal
toast
vault
wave

duck
run
tennis
unique
wedding
measure
animal
word
tools
cards
work
sky
religion
airport
bread
money
ocean

doctor
skin
noise
steak
phone
king
close
jail
tear
shovel
stick
actor
head
illness
champagne
jump
hello

beak
fast
net
unusual
engagement
inch
fins
period
barn
ace
employee
moon
pray
bus
butter
safe
surf

fake
white
bang
meat
call
dictator
envelope
penalty
fur
garden
rod
movie
bone
end
wine
pole
bye

lunch
help
knowledge
years
robin
boots
expect
spice
teen
marina
danger
rubbing
hook
surplus
toy
made
humor
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APPENDIX D HIC APPROVAL FORMS
Stimuli norming:
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Pilot:
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Final data collection:
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Most research supports a non-selective (or exhaustive) account of activation whereby
multiple meanings of a word are initially activated (as discussed in Degani & Tokowicz, 2009).
But what happens to the non-selected meaning of an ambiguous word (e.g., bark) and how is the
decision made to select one meaning over the other? A great deal of research by Gernsbacher and
colleagues suggests that the non-selected meaning is “discarded” via active suppression, but a
competing activation-only account is also proposed by Gorfein’s research group. The present
dissertation examines meaning-selection in ambiguous words using a word to elicit meaning
context (rather than a sentence). Additionally, manipulations of perceptual focus (Experiment 2)
and cognitive load (Experiment 3) were employed to examine these processes. Results support
Gernsbacher’s Structure-Building Framework (a suppression account) of meaning selection. An
updated conceptualization of ambiguity resolution is proposed.
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